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Introduction

A traveler viewing Alsace today for the first time
would never suspect the difficult and stormy past which has
plagued this beautiful little country.

The fertile plains,

the vineyards, and the Vosges mountains on the French side
of the Rhine are mirrored on the German side of the valley,
extending to the mountains of the Black Forest.

The cultures

of these two great civilizations, too, mingle here, enrich
and reflect each other.

Language is a perfect example of

this junction OI cultures.

Most ihhabitants are at least

bilingual, speaking both the local dialect, which is of
Germanic origin, and either French or German.

Many are tri

lingual and speak all three languages with equal facility.
The situation has seldom been so tranquil, however.
Alsace and Lorraine have long been disputed between Prance
and Germany.

Prized for their location, which is crucial

militarily, and for their natural cesources, the most impor
tant being coal and lron, the two provinces have

su££e~ed

more than their share of invasions, seizures, and changes of
government.

As languages, customs, races, personalities,

and governments mingle without necessarily integrating, the
cultural pattern of the "parent"

country lS reflected.

A

study of Alsace-Lorraine is thus a study of the interaction
of the French and the Germans.
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In this paper I hope to show a bit of this relationship
b~tween

France and Germany as the history of Alsace-Lorraine

unfolds itself for analysis.

The first chapter will briefly

review the history of Alsace and Lorraine up to 1871.
nally provinces of the

Origi

(German) Holy Roman Empire, Alsace

and Lorraine gradually became French, both physically, through
piecemeal acquisition of land by the French, and spiritually,
mainly as a.result of the French Revolution of 1789.

The

second chapter will examine in depth the attitudes, ambitions,
and justifications used by both nations prior to the annexa
tion of Alsace-Lorraine by Germany in 1871.

This period

leads directly to the ,third chapter, in which we will analyze
political and social developments in the Reichsland, or
imperial territory, during the crucial period from tre Franco
Prussian War to World War I--the time of German rule over a
territory that had been decidedly pro-French.

Though the new

rulers of Alsace-Lorraine tried thcir best to Germanize the
inhabitants, we will see that the success of the program,
despite'its promising moments, was limited at best.

In the

end, the independent Alsatians and Lorrainers were returned
to France, the mother country, where they continue to this
day their celebration of their own unique culture.

Chapter I

To fully understand any portion of the history of Alsace
Lorraine, it is necessary to have a basic understanding of
her entire past.

Thus it is the purpose of this chapter to

set out in brief the development of this area and the forces
which shaped it.
Some common misconceptions persist about Alsace-Lorraine
which need to be cleared up before we proceed.

First of all,

the idea of the "Alsace-Lorrainer" as a species must be
scrapped.

There is not now, nor has there ever been, any

such person.

Alsace and ,Lorraine were two separate and quite

dissimilar provinces of pre-revolutionary France, with indi
vidual backgrounds, traditions, physical attributes, and
outlooks.

Technically, neither has existed at all since the

French Revolution in 1789, when Lorraine became the depart
ments Meuse, Moselle, Meurthe-et-Moselle, and Vosges, and
Alsace the departments Haut-Rhin and Bas-Rhin.

The two

provinces were first unified into the entity "Alsace-Lorraine"
in 1871, after the Franco-Prussian War, when France ceded to
Germany all of Alsace, except the free city Belfort, and most
of Lorraine.

Alsace-Lorraine prior to this time must conse

quently be considered as her two components, Alsace and
Lorraine.
To quote the expert David Starr Jordan, "It is generally
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recognized that the question of Alsace-Lorraine is mainly

a question of Alsace."l

In the majority of this paper we

will be concerned with events and developments in Alsace; SOme

background on Lorraine, however, is still necessary and appro
.

prlate.

2

Lorraine, a former province of eastern France bounded on
the north by Belgium and Luxembourg, on the north-east by

West Germany, on the east by Alsace, on the west by Champagne,
and on the south by Franche-Comte, first came into existence
around A.D.

800 as a part of the Holy Roman Empire of Charlemagne.

Prior to this time the area had been inhabited and governed
by a succession of Celtic and Germanic tribes, by the Romans,
and by the nomadic tribes during the Great Migration of Peoples
in the fifth century.

Charlmagne's son, Louis the Pious,

succeeded his father but, without his strength and forceful
personality, was unable to hold the empire together.

Upon

his death it was divided into three parts for three of his
sons: Charles II (Charles the Bald)

inherited the western

section, which was to become France; Lewis the German received
the eastern section, the future Germany; and to .Lothair, the
eldest son, went the imperial crown and the middle section,
which became known as Lotharingia.
In 959 the duchy ","as divided into Lower and Upper Lotharin
gia, with the ducal authority in the latter going to Frederick I
of Bar of the House of Ardennes, which held it until 1033.
From 1033 to 1047, Upper Lotharingia was under the House of
Verdun; it then passed to the lIouse of Alsace in 1048.

During

the twelfth and thirteenth centuries, although the German
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duchies in Lower Lotharingia split into a swarm of principalities,
Upper Lotharingia remained for the most part in the hands of
its dukes, relatively solid and coherent.
Upper and Lower

Lotha~ingia

Politically, both

continued as part of the Holy

Roman Empire, while culturally, French influence became more
dominant undor the French kings Philip III
Philip IV (1285-1314)

(1270-85)

and

as the Holy ,Roman Empire weakened.

Gradually the French began to exert political influence as

well.

In 1297 the city of-Metz was obtained by France; by

1301, the area was half French; in 1444, Charles VIII of France
invaded Lorraine and demanded authority as part of his cam
paign to rebuild a strong monarchy in France.

The Dukes of

Lorraine and the Counts of Bar had become French as well as
German princes back in the thirteenth century and as such
took part in the destructive Hundred Years War between France
and England (1337-1453).

In the fifteenth century, Duke

Charles the Bold of Burgundy made a play for power in Lorraine
but was finally defeated by a joint Lorrainer-Swiss army
early in 1477.

Lorraine'retained its independence.

The

Reformation and the wars which followed increased the influence
of the French kings. still moro during the sixteenth century.
According to an agreement of August 26, 1552

(which was not

ratified until 1561). the emperor Charles V, in desperate
need of money. recognized the. virtual secession of Lorraine
and Bar from the empire, while they agreed to pay a fixed
amount of annual taxes.

The sudden French conquest of Protes

tant Germany led to the cession by the Germans of the bishoprics
Metz, Toul, and Verdun to France at the Treaty of Chambord
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of January, 1552.

The French under their new king Henry II

also occupied theoretically independent Lorraine and Luxembourg
at the same-time.

Though hostilities were renewed by Emperor

Charles V of Germany, he was unable to regain any lost terri
tory.

It 15 this same conguest-oriented mentality which was

to vindicate the Germans in their own eyes for their annexa
tion of Alsace and Lorraine in 1871.
Though Lorraine was still theoretically independent under
her dukes, she was virtually controlled by France in the
seventeenth century, as actions described above led to further

acquisitions.

The Treaty of Westphalia (1648), which ended

the Thirty Years·War, confirmed the Treaty of Chambord and
the concession of Metz, Toul, and Verdun.

The French govern

ment offered the Duke-of Lorraine impossible terms of peace
and thus confirmed its true'· control over the territory.

Parts

of Lorraine occupied during the Thirty Years War in 1632 were
evacuated by the French in 1661 only after more territorial
concessions.

The armies of Louis XIV occupied Lorraine once

again in 1670.-

The Treaty· of Ryswick in 1697 ended the War

of the Grand Alliance between members of the League of Augsburg,
consisting of the German Empire, Great Britain, the Netherlands,
Spain and Sweden on the one hand, and Louis XIV of France on
the other.

Although France was not decisively defeated in

this war, Louis XIV had to submit to the League's terms, and
Lorraine was restored to its dukes, but only after more land
was surrendered to France.
The eighteenth century finally brought the definite
acquisition of Lorraine by France.

Duke Francis III of Lorraine
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was engaged to the Austrian heiress Maria Theresa, when in
1733 the War of the Polish Succession broke out between France
and Austria.

France immediately seized Lorraine.

The peace

settlement provided for the transfer of Lorraine and Bar to
Stanislas Leszczynski, father-in-law of Louis XV, with the
stipulation that the duchy pass to France upon his death,
wh~ch

occurred in 1766.

As an integral part of France, Lorraine shared with her
the problems and successes of democracy:

the Revolution of

1789, the revolutionary wars, Napoleon's rise and fall,
Restoration, and the Second Empire.
War

the

After the Franco-Prussian

(1870), Lorraine was divided and relinquished in part to

Germany.
In the minds of many authors, and even in the mind of
the French people,
, Alsace was the dominant character in the
forced union of Alsacc-Lorraine.
the Alsatians of 1914:
rather than for Hetz.,,3
Strasbourg,

David Starr Jordan quotes

"The French people mourn for Strasbourg
It was the statue representing

therefore Alsace, on the Place de la Concorde in

Paris which was draped in mourning for over forty years, not
the statue for Lorraine.

It seems appropriate, then, to con

sider the political and social development of Alsace in
greater detail.
The earliest known inhabitants of the area between the
Rhine River and the Vosges, known today as Alsace, were
Ligurians and, predominantly, Celts, near 2000 B.C.

The

five-hundred-year-long Roman domination of what they called
Germania.superior brought along with its civilization the

10
longest period of peace which Alsace was to know--250 years. 4
Subsequently invaded by the Alemanni, the Franks, the Sarmalians,

the Burgundi, the Vandals, and the Huns,S Alsace experienced
both the hardships and the advantages of being a fertile cross
roads of continental Europe.
The death in A.D. 869 of Emperor Lothair caused a struggle
between the two grandsons of Charlemagne, Lewis the German and
Charles the Bald of France, for possession of Lotharingia.
The Treaty of Mersen settled the dispute in 870.

Lotharingia

was divided between France and Germany, and Alsace became a
part of German Lotharingia.

It was to remain a province of

the Holy Roman Empire for eight hundred years.

In the thir

teenth century, with the fall of the ruling Hohenstaufen
family,

independent principalities developed in Lower Alsace,

known as Nordgau, while Upper Alsace, or Sundgau, passed to
the Hapsburg family.

The Decapolis, the Union of Ten Free

Cities, was established in 1354 in Nordgau, giving the
Hapsburgs a slight measure of control there.

Strasbourg

became a republic under a bishop (at the suggestion of the
emperor, Charles IV), while the League of Free Cities, under
an imperial governor, controlled the rest of Nordgau for two
hundred years, practically without external domination or
influence.
The Treaty of Westphalia, which ended the Thirty Years
War in 1648, provided for compensations for the victorious
French in- Alsace,

though the terms were rather fuzzy.

The

ruling Hapsburgs of the German Empire relinquished their
possessions in Sundgau but had only suzerainty to offer in
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Nordgau.

The Frene]1 king Louis XIV, however, pressed for

territorial concessions and spent the remainder of his reign
incorporating the rest of Alsace.

From 1677 to 1680, his

"chambers of reunion, ,. which consisted of selected French

courts, declared his claims incontestable and annexed the free
cities and. most Alsatian principalities.

In 1681 Louis XIV

seized .. Strasbourg, the only surviving imperial city.

What

little remained of free Alsuce finally fell to the French
during the Revolution'and the reign of Napoleon.

The Congress

of Vienna confirmed these "last acquisitions in .1815.

Alsace and Lorraine both experienced a cultural and poli
tical renaissance in the eighteenth century.6

Authors of the

Enlightenment such as the Frenchmen Montesquieu, Rousseau,
Diderot, and Voltaire, the Germans Kant and Lessing, and the
Americans Paine, Jefferson, and Franklin, expressed optimistic,
bold, humane new ideas well-suited to the democratic, indepen
dent spirit which had developed in Alsace.

Their philosophies

encouraged a rational, scientific approach to all areas of
human endeavor, a secular view of the world, and a general
sense of progress and perfectibility.

The Alsatians had been

well-prepared for the new ideas by their past:

they had

become practically autonomous while the German Emperor waged
his wars.

Most say the new regime was greeted enthusiastically

in 1789. 7

Any disunity or opposition which might have sprung

from the disadvantages of French trade laws, which went into
effect after the Revolution, was quashed in 1792 with the
outbreak of the revolutionary wars and their accompanying
burst of patriotism.

These wars grew in part from a problem
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peculiar to Alsace:

one-sixth of the province was still owned

and governed by German princes who realized that the Revolu
tion was a challenge to their dominance. S
A factor which tied the Alsatians still closer in spirit
to France was Napoleon's rise at the turn of the century.

It

can be said that the Revolution made Alsace French, while
Napoleon cemented the political bonds.

The liberal Alsatians

supported Napoleon's rise because of his, liberal social poli
cies and his Concordat with the Vatican of 1801.

Although

he put an end to democracy and republicanism, he continued
unification (through wars)

By 1815, when

and social reforms.

Napoleon suffered his famous defeat at Waterloo on June 18,
the people had tired of his imperialistic wars.

Prussia, at

the Congress of Vienna (181S), pressed for the surrender of
Alsace and Lorraine, but, fortunately, the other Allies
resisted, knowing it would only lead to further hostilities.
~7

The Prussinas did not abandon their hopes, however, and would

'\1

- '

make the same demands again in 1871.
frontier

The loss of the Rhine

(including Cologne, Aix-la-Chapelle, and Treves)

~n

1814 had deeply wounded the French pride, and the Allies realized
that more demands might provoke another war.

The Rheinischer

Merkur, a liberal Alsatian paper, admitted that in 1815 the
Alsatians talked of burning villages and emigrating with
their cattle to avoid being subjected to the petty German
despots. 9

~vould

fifty-six years greatly change their feelings

toward the Germans?
Th8 vacuum after Napoleon's fall was filled by the
monarchy in the person of Louis XVIII.

In 1830 the Bourbon
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dynasty was restored, and Louis Philippe, Duke of Orleans, was
chosen king.

Though.the Bourbon Restoration was better received

in Lorraine than in Alsace, it aroused at best lukewarm support.
The "bourgeois monarchy" faced. pronounced Alsatian opposition,

predominantly from merchants,

factory OWners, and lawyers,

who resisted the monarchy's repressive policies. 10

Protec

tionist tariffs ultimately produced an economic slide, especially
in Mulhouse, which was dependent on its export textile indus
try.

Financial and food crises plagued the land in IB16,and

1817, and Strasbourg's Rhine traffic trade was devastated.

"In the long run, the 'bourgeois monarchy'

lost favor in

Alsace because it ultimately failed to advance the interests
of the local commercial and industrial magnates."ll
Despite some dissatisfaction with the government, the
Alsatians in 1848 enthusiastically celebrated the bicentennial
of their annexation to France, 12 and the overthrow of Louis
Philippe came as a surprise.13

In Alsace and Lorraine, rela

tive calm prevailed in the vacuum between governments, and
a smooth transition from monarchy to republican councils was
achieved.
Although little was happening within their own country
to worry them, Bismarck's wars of 1864 and 1865 aroused alarm
and apprehension in the Alsatians, who feared his next move-
and they were not mistaken.

Although Bismarck is often

accused, and justly so, of having engineered the FrancoPruss ian War of 1870, both sides entered the dispute with high
hopes for success and territorial gains.
had been wagered, and France lost the bet.

It was as if Alsace
Fighting began
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in early August of 1870 in northern Alsacei the French surren
dered on September 2.
In a larger sense, the Germans may have won this battle
while losing a greater war.

Their policy during the conflict

of terrorization of civilians, intended to break Alsatian
spirit, merely steeled their resolution.

The bombardment of

Strasbourg, in which 300· civilians were killed,

2000 injured,

and 600 homes burned, did not endear ,the Germans to the natives.
They could only watch while their beloved cathedral was damaged
intentionally and without military justification.

"Such was

the first manifestation of the love of the Germans for their
long-lost brothers.,,14

Chapter II

The two- or three-year period just prior to the annexation
of Alsace-Lorraine by Germany is a very interesting one.

An

examination of the Alsatian and German attitudes of this time
can shed some light on reactions and relationships which
would develop during the period of the annexation itself.
The Treaty of Frankfort of 1871 lays ,the foundation for the
drama to be played out between France and Germany in AlsaceLorraine.

Justificatio0s of the treaty (by the Germans) and

reactions to it (by the Alsatians) will also be included in
this chapter as further indications of the political and
social temper which inaugurated the annexation.
Alsace was hardly a social "Garden of Eden" in 1869.
Political unrest and discontent with the government of Napoleon III
were growlng, and religious, economic, and political schisms
.

were deepenlng.

1

The dissatisfaction with Napoleon III sprung

mainly from disagreement with his aggressive international
policies.

How could the Alsatians be expected to support a

war in which their country was the pawn?

The new republic,

which replaced Napoleon III after he was taken prisoner by
the Germans on September I, 1870, was greeted with hopes for
a better-directed war, with a better chance of winning, or
at the least, honorable peace negotiations.

The tradidtional

Catholic-Protestant antipathy in Alsace-Lorraine intensified.
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Political divisions along religious lines were much stronger
than usual in the last regular French parliamentary election
in 1869.

The anti-Catholic particularist movement gained

momentum as war became imminent.

The particularists proposed

making Alsace a neutral state, theoretically independent of
both Germany and France, but economically dependent on Germany.
The particularists were pragmatists:

they saw Germany's

phenomenal economic development and sensed German victory in
any war.
that is,

And being anti-Catholic, they were also anti-Paris,
anti~French-government.

But the particularists were

far from popular with most Alsatians.

The League of Alsace,

a group.of unknown membership dedicated to stopping all
Germanization of

Alsace,~.branded

The particularist

defense?

all particularists traitors.

They were merely being practical,

trying to gain political and economic concessions from the
next ruler of Alsace.
scrap of aid.

And economically, Alsace needed any

Alsace, especially the city of Mulhouse, was

highly dependent on its textile industry, which was very
closely held by a few wealthy, inbred families.

There was

almost no upward mobility into management, and the owners
felt little sympathy toward the commoners who worked for them.
In June of 1870, ·a 20% wage reduction in the form of higher
rents--workers lived in factory-owned housing--caused a major
labor strike, crippling the textile industry.

Late that

summer, war coupled with the effect of the strikes made pro
duction impossible.

Many Alsatians, appreciating the advan

tages of a well-disciplined state, realized that only German
authorities could revive the failing Alsatian economy and
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Thus the rift between the practical

avoid a social revolution.

pro-Germans and the sentimental pro-French in Alsace deepened.
The armistice agreement of January 29, 1871, provided
for French elections to an assembly which would decide whether
to continue the war, or the terms on which France would no2go
tiate for peace.

The election in Alsace-Lorraine could be

viewed, then, as a plebescite on annexation.

It would show

the strength of the various groups described above, as the
Alsatians went to the polls to choose their representatives.
The election was scheduled for February 8,

1871.

Though the

Prussians did all in their power to discourage the voters,
even announcing a false change of election date, only the
Reichstag elections of 1874 and 1887, for the German assembly,
prompted a larger turnout.
Many

con~entators

2

have concluded that there was greater

pro-war, anti-German unity of sentiment shown in the election
results than actually existed.

Leon
"
Gambetta, the great French

proponent of "war to the end!" did win a seat in all four
departments ultimately ceded to Germany.

In Bas-Rhin, however,

Jules Favre, who advocated peace on honorable terms, that is,
probable·annexation, received 54,514 votes to Gambetta's
56,271.

The department Haut-Rhin returned two anti-German

delegates, one autonomist, and Frederick }]artmann, who was
the first to be labled a traitor by the League of Alsace.
German attitudes and ambitions, on the other hand, can
best be judged by their actions prior to the Treaty of Frank
fort, rather than by their opinions.

The Germans, unlike the

French, are not known for the lively vocal expression of any
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Their reasoning was pragmatic, military,

and all emotions.

and conquest-oriented.

Keep in mind that Germany at this

time was, at best, a loose confederation of independent states
fighting fiercely for ascendancy.
nationa-l sentiment.

They had little or no

France, on the other hand,

had been a

nation .for close to a thousand years and had developed a

nationalistic, sentimental way of thinking.

They saw the

potential 1055 of Alsace-Lorraine not as the unavoidable

result of a military defeat,
their homeland.

b~t

This divergence

as the ruthless mutilation of
10

points of view is the

underlying cause of the whole problem of Alsace-Lorraine.

Germany's fundamental, overruling objective was military
security.

They felt that possession of the area west of the

Rhine would protect tpem from French aggression.
this a new notion.

Nor was

Prussia had pressed for the surrender of

Alsace-Lorraine at the Congress of Vienna in 1815, and the
demand had been a recurring political theme in Berlin S1nce
the 1840 's'.

Croym Prince Friedrich Wilhelm on August 14,

1870, soon after the: outbreak of war, expressed a common

sentiment when. he deemed it imperative to deprive

Fran~e

of

some territory to ·kE.;ep her from disturbing the peace, but not
necessarily to give the conquered territory to Prussia. 3
General Heinrich von Trietschke put it bluntly:
even had the

~lsatians

he said that

been Japanese, Germany.would have

annexed them to capitalize on the military value of Metz and
Strasbourg.~

The Germans had other motives for annexation aside from
the military matters.

First of all, despite the Catholic
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Protestant schism, Alsace and Lorraine were 80% Catholic, which
appealed very strongly to the Catholic South German states.
Their eagerness to welcome new Catholics into the empire was
more than religious conviction;'political gain was the goal.
Secondly, Alsace and Lorraine_were very rich in natural resour
ces, especially iron and coal.

Because of economic trauma,

the mines were not producing much in 1870, but the Germans
had the technology and the determination to alter that situa

tion.

In 1913, for instance, of the 28,607,000 total tons

of iron ore produced in Germany,

from Lorraine. S

21,135,000 tons would come

Finally, it has been suggested that the

Germans feared the French Revolution and its democratic prin
ciples. 6

Democracy posed a direct threat to German feudalism

and absolute monarchy.

By confiscating French territory,

German rulers may have hoped to keep France and her dangerous
democratic ideas under control.
Once the Germans had decided that they needed AlsaceLorraine, two major decisions remained.
should they annex?

First, how much

Second, what would they do with the terri

tory once it was theirs?

It was a foregone conclusion that

Germany would annex practically all of Alsace.

The logical

objective in the decision of the amount of Lorraine taken was
to maximize insurance against French aggression and at the
same time to minimize the area of French-speaking Lorraine
annexed.

Many of the generals of the dominant military,

however, were after revenge.

They wanted to permanently

cripple France, not just slow her down.
von Alvensleben,

~

General Gustav

for example, advocated taking all of France
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east of the Marne River, a territory at least twice the
of Alsace-Lorraine. 7

SlZC

Metz, an extremely French city in

Lorraine, was a pivotal issue in the dispute.

Bismarck him

self did not want'Metz because he knew its annexation would
only cause trouble and included it in the initial demands only
as a point on which he could later compromise.

But General

Helmuth von Moltke emphasized its military value, equating
its'possession with 120,000 troops.
The generals wanted it.

King Wilhelm wanted it.

Finally Bismarck agreed to the inclu

sion of Metz to avoid a falling-out with the military.

With

out Bismarck's moderating influence, Germany would probably
have annexed far more territory.8
Once the amount of territory to be included had been
determined, the Germans still had to decide what to do with
their new possession.

There were several alternatives.

Alsace-Lorraine could become a part of one of the existing
German states.

This practice was not at all uncommon--petty

rulers were often rewarded for their loyalty (and their troops)
with a present of part of the spoils of war.

Prussia, the

dominant state in the confederation, had the strongest claim,
but all the South German liberals opposed that solution.
Their suggestion was to give Alsace-Lorraine to Bavaria, the
dominant South German state, but Prussia would have no part
of that.

Bavaria already seemed overly greedy, and their

possession of Alsace-Lorraine would only increase the Bavarian
Prussian rivalry.

Perhaps Alsace-Lorraine could become a

neutral buffer state?

~No,

that could never work, either.

autonomists in Alsace were strong, but not strong enough to

The
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overcome the pro-French faction.

'Alsace-Lorraine must remain
Finally it was proposed

under the legal control of Germany.

that Alsace-Lorraine become a Reichsland, a federal possession
belonging to all the states together.

This satisfied liberals

and conservatives, Prussians and Bavarians, Catholics and
Protestants.

Many even hoped that owning' common property

would help unite the states into' a'great empire.

Upon first

thought, it may seem strange that the Germans did not consider
making Alsacc-Lorraine a state of the empire equal to all the
others.

But the Germans did not yet trust the Alsatians enough

to give them

autonomy-~Reichsland

status was supposedly a

preparation for future statehood, which would never materialize.
Frederick the Great, Germany's most illustrious national
hero, once said:

"Let us take; after that we shall always

find lawyers enough to defend our rights.,,9
case with Alsace-Lorraine.

This was not the

Long before the Treaty of Frankfort

was signed, or even. imagined ,German lawyers and thinkers
were busy preparing justifications for their country's ambi
tions.

We have already examined Germany's motives; now let

us inspect her defenses.

Four basic justifications can be

found, aside from the fact that the Germans were the victors
and, as such, could do as they pleased:
geography, and historical rights.

ethnology, linguistics,

.Unfortunately, none of

them hold up very well under close scrutiny.
Many skulls of the German dolichocephalic type were found
ln Alsace-Lorraine.

While the Germans pointed to this as

evidence of their prior claim to the land, all it really proves
is that the long-headed Germans immigrated among the round
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headed eel ts.

In any case, racial boundaries no longer deter

mine national boundaries.

France and Belgium, for instance,

are of the same racial stem; Switzerland has within its borders people of at least three distinct races.
With their second point, linguistics, the Germans hoped
to establish a more solid claim.

It was undisputed that a

majority of the Alsatians spoke German as their mother tongue.
But if one-language-one-nation was to be the Germun philosophy,
there remained some inconsistencies to be resolved.
Prussia absorb Poles, Slavs, and Danes?

How could

And linguistics

certainly did not justify the inclusion of Metz, a thoroughly
French city, in the annexed territory.
The geographic argument was that the Vosges mountains,
the western border of Alsace, were the natural boundary
between France and Germany.

But why must it be the Vosges

instead of, for instance, the .. Rhine River?
won the war,
relinquish

Had the French

the Germans certainly would not have agreed to

th~ir

territory.between the Rhine and the mountains

of the Dlack Forest, an area symmetrical to Alsace.

Nor were

they consistent in the application of their principle.

Much

of the annexed portion of Lorraine lay west of the Vosges.
Their

f~nal argum~nt

wasjthat Alsace and Lorraine had

been German before they ,were French, and for a much longer
time.

The logic of this could also be disputed.

The Holy

Roman Empire was the Qredecessor of the German Empire which
Bismarck hoped to build, but it was definitely not the same
creature.

And Alsace and.Lorraine had been loosely-held

fringe possessions rather than whole-hearted participants in

L-
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the imperial grandeur.

The

(German)

Holy Roman Empire,

though

it officially teld the territory for the longest, was noL Lhe

Perhaps Alsace and Lorraine should pass to

original ruler.

the Italians, descendants of the Romans, who had an older
claim than that of the Germans.
won the

Franco-Pruss~an

conquest,

But the Italians hac not

war; the Germans had.

The right of

"to the victor go the spoils," was Germanyls real

claim to hegemony.
Legally, the Treaty of Frankfort of 1871 resolved the
question.

"Fra:).ce renounces.

in [aver of the German Empire,

all rights and titles to the territories situated east of
the frontier designated below.

The German Empire shall possess

these territories forever, in full sovereignLy a.nd ownership. ,,10
Although many respected Frenchmen urged the French govermnent
not to sign, the Assembly of Bordeaux really had no alterna

tive.

They had to choose between "mutilation" and probable

annihilation.

So on

~lay

10, 1871, 1694 villages, towns, and

cities, 1,S9"/,538 people, 5600 square miles--an area about the
size of Connecticut and Rhode Island--were ceded by France to
Germany "in full sovereignty and ownership. ,,11
with the last flourish of the pen, the Germans considered
the problem settled once and for all.

Twenty years later, in

1892"the Parisian newspaper Le Figaro asked the President
of the Reichstag, Herr von
Alsace-Lorrainc.

Levct~ow,

about the problem of

His reply was as follows:

In your letter of the twenty-fourth of last
January, you wcr~ so kind as to honor me with a series
of inquiries concerning the possibility of a peace
ful solution to the "question of Alsace-Lorraine."
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All these inquiries are answered by the provision
of the first article of the peace preliminaries,
confirmed by the treaty of May 10 , 1871, between
France and the German Empire and according to which
the regions designated as· the territory of Alsace
Lorraine are ceded forever, in complete sovereignty
and possession, to the German Empire.
In referring to this clause of the treaty, I have
the honor to beg you to accept the expression of
my esteem.12
For the Alsatians, on the other hand, the Treaty of
Frankfort had posed a question, "not answered one.

On February 17,

1871, the representatives:to the National Assembly at Bordeaux

from Alsace and Lorraine affirmed "the immutable will of
Alsace and Lorraine to remain French," declared the settlement
"a legitimate and permanent provocation to war," and stated,
"We hold to be null and void every act and treaty, vote or
plebescite, which would consent to the abandonment, in favor
of the foreigner, of all or of any part of our provinces of
li.lsace and Lorraine."l3

On March 14, 1871, they reiterated:

"We declare once more null and void a compact which disposes
of us

. h out our consent." 14

w~t

Before the final decision to

sign the treaty, the representatives of the two provinces
staged an emotional walkout to express their disapproval.
This may have been a spectacular display of sentiment, but it
also left Alsace and Lorraine unrepresented in the final
deliberations.
Unfortunately,

the German government accepted the pro

tests at Bordeaux as an accurate gauge of the Alsatian mood.
Certainly, the majority of the Alsatians still favored France,
but conciliation was not as yct a lost cause.

German officers

stationed in Alsacc reported that many Alsatians welcomed
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the chance to rid themselves of the repressive French irnperial
government.

The Germans, still insecure in their power, had

two considerations to weigh:

winning the sympathy of the new

addition to their population. and their own national security.
They felt that national defense could only be achieved by
5upressing the democratic spirit of the people, depriving
them of the rights to which they were accustomed.

Thus began

a struggle for respect and autonomy which lasted for forty
seven years.

Chapter

:pI

The only recurring motif for the events in the German
Confusion, misun

Reichsland from 1871 to 1918 is suspicion.

derstanding, vacillation--these dominated German policies

Alsace-Lorraine.

10

The German attitude is itself marked by a

fundamental contradiction:

the insistence by the authorities

that their "long-lost brothers" were Germans was incompatible
with the policy of Germanization imposed upon them.

David

Starr Jordan cites a typical German response to an inquiry
about Alsace-Lorraine:
Lorraine:

"There is no question of Alsace-

the land is German by tradition, by history, by

language, by conquest, and by military necessity.

Alsace-

Lorraine must be forced to resume the Teutonism her people
had relinquished. "I

If the people were so thoroughly German,

what need was there to "Germanize" them?

Though an anonymous

German university student sees the Alsatian response a little
more clearly,

he maintains the same belief.

are Germans after all.

"These people

Our professors tell us so.

It is out

of sheer perversity that they call trwmselves French.
yet, the more we cudgel them,

the more French they claim to

be and the less they like us.,,2
foundation of their policy,

And

With such a crack in the

it is little wonder that efforts

to Germanize the Alsatians and Lorrainers, to incorporate
them into the empire, were a failure.

J!L

Seldom can an honest
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effort at conciliation or a sincere COncern on the part of
the government for the citizens of Alsace-Lorraine be discerned.
Alsatian interests were consistently sacrificed to those of
the Reich in all areas--political, military, and economic.
The German authorities were convinced of the superiority of
their imposed benefaction.

As Trietschke affirmed.

"We know

better how to govern Alsace than the Alsatians know themselves."]
And in 1871, despite protests from the democratically-minded
Alsatians, the period of "superior" German rule began.

The initial plan of "government was itself offensive to
the· democratic, independent Alsatians.

It divided the Reichs

land into three "presidencies I " upper Alsace,

and Lorraine.

Lower Alsace,

These in turn were divided into "circles,"

six

in Upper Alsace and eight each in Lower Alsace and Lorraine.
Each circle had its own Director.

Supervising the entire

Reichsland was a President-Superior, responsible only to the
Kaiser.

Being an imperial territory, not a state, Alsace-

Lorraine was entitled to no representatives in the federal
legislature.

On December 30, 1871, the famous--or infamous-

Dictatorship" Article legalized arbitrary government in the
Reichsland.

"In the case of danger for the public safety,

the President-Superior is authorized to take all measures
which he may consider necessary to prevent this danger.
is,

He

in particular, authorized to exercize, in the district

threatened, the power conferred upon the military authorities
in the case of the state of siege by the law of August 9, 1849."
These military powers included the right-to search homes,
remove offenders, order the surrender of arms, and forbid

Jt
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"
'
4
pu bi ~catlons
an d meet1ngs.

Thus the President-superior was

empowered to callout all troops stationed in Alsace-Lorraine
and-impose arbitrary rule whenever he deemed it "necessary."
With this threat of authoritarianism hanging over them,
the number of Alsatians and Lorrainers who choSE:! to exercise

the only right granted them by the Treaty of Frankfort is not
surprising.

This right, Article Two of the treaty, was the

citizenship option.

"French citizens, born in the ceded terri

tories, actually domiciled in the territory, who expect to
preserve French citizenship, may do so, up to October 1, 1872,
by means of a preliminary declaration made to the competent

authority, and by means of transferring

th~ir

domicile to

France and fixing it there, without this right being subject
to alteration by laws of military service, in which case they
will retain French citizenship. ,,5
to the option process:
emigration.

There were,

then, two parts

filing the option papers, and actual

The League of Alsace

~ncouraged

all

citiz~ns

opt, to make their feelings known, but not to emigrate.

to

They

felt that Alsatians could best serve their country by remaining
to protect her culture and fight for her interests.

In Upper

Alsace, the League's stronghold, 20% of the population (91,962
people) filed options; in Lower Alsace, only 7% of the popula
tion (39,190 people) opted; and in Lorraine, only 6% of the
population (2B,639 people)

filed the papers.

statistics, however, were reversed.

The emigra tion

In Lorraine, 75% of the

opt ants emigrated;in Lower Alsace, 29% of the optants left;
but in Upper Alsace, all but IB% of the optants remained.
Of the 160,000 options filed, the Germans considered only

6
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60,000 valid, because the remainder did not emigrate.

The

effect of -annexation on specific groups within the population

is also interesting.

Magistrates, for instance, were valuable

to the new regime and were offered rewards in return for their
continued cooperation.

The Germans hoped to gain respect

from the people and prove that "nothing had changed" in AlsaceLorraine by preserving the local jUdiciary.
all but six of the magistrates emigrated.

Unfortunately,
Overall, 80% of the

local governmental officials opted to preserve French citi
zenship by leaving their homeland.

Teachers had to weigh

increased salaries and benefits against teaching the German
version of history under German regulation.

Charlemagne, for

instance, was now known only as a German king.

.

also c h ose to emlgrate.

Many teachers

7

Embarrass8d by the mass emigration, President-Superior
M~ller

tried to make it more difficult for draft-aged minors

to avoid German military service by going to France.

On

March 16, 1872, he declared that parents of minors had to opt
as well for the children's options to be valid.
slow the mass draft evasion by the Alsatians.

This did not
These men

were not cowards; they simply did not wish to serve in the
German army.

Many of them, in fact, enlisted in the French

army or the Foreign Legion.

Neither the German policies of

conciliation, such as better terms of service for the rich
and the educated, nor coercion, prosecution of draft evaders,
had much effect on the draft evasion rate, which was as high
as 25% in 1879.

8

But the 75% of the draftees who served in

the German army are not to be ignored.

Jjl

The German army, along
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with the schools, was to be the primary instrument of Germani

za tion.

Its success, however, can be disputed.

Alsatian

soldiers, . considered too unreliable to serve in their sensitive
homeland, were often sent to Prussia for their tours of
,

duty.

,

Accord1ng to Andre Hallays, many of these young men

saw their task in doing their best in the Prussian army, and
in winning respect for themselves as Alsatians.
might serve in Prussia and become Germanized,

9

Though others

says Hallays,

they resumed their comfortable (superior) Alsatian ways upon
their return.

10

The second important instrument of Germanization was the
school system, and the Germans attacked this phase of the
program with their usual zeal.

ny August of 1870 they had

already established administrative organs in the territory and
were regulating education and religion as well as keeping
order.

Technically, they did not have the right to do this

until after the Preliminary Peace of March 2, 1871, but many
' '
conSl'ct ere d 'It· 1 egltlmate
as an act 0 f war. 11

Religion, edu

cation, and language were inextricably intertwined in AlsaceLorraine and will thus be discussed together.
The Church had gained much control over education during
the reign of Napoleon III, who realized that priests and nuns
required much smaller salaries and were less expensive than
secular teachers.

The Germans maintained, however, that edu

cation was a function of the state and uS8d the Concordat of
1801, in a round-about way, to achieve their goal.

The status

of the Concordat, which was an agreement between Napoleon and
the Pope, was uncertain in Alsace-Lorraine after the annexation.

,\
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under Article Seventeen of the Concordat, non-Catholic rulers
of France lost the right to appoint priests and bishops, but

could negotiate with the Pope to regain this right.
Emperor wilhelm I was neither French nor

Catholi~.

be granted the right to name priests by the Pope?
whole Concordat invalid?

Since
could he
Or was the

An official decision was never reached.

The Pope at first declared Article Seventeen invalid in AlsaceLorraine, which was meant to halt all govenment episcopal
appointments.

The Germans, however, interpreted this as an
ent~re

abrogation of the

concordat and a license to regulate

religion in the Reichsland as they pleased.
changed his mind.

The Pope quickly

The result of all this vacillation was de

facto recognition by both church and state of the Concordat
of 1801.

To the Church,

German legislation.

/

it was a safeguard from arbitrary

To Berlin, i t was a means to secular

control of education.

The Church controlled the schools;

if

the German government controlled episcopal appointments, it
therefore controlled education.
The first measures taken,by the Germans were to increase
salaries of .teachers and to make attendance in elementary
schools compulsory.

Bismarck wanted to rid the school system

of as many clerical instructors as possible.

Jesuits, who

were predominantly teachers, and some orders of nuns, were
Integration of sexes in some schools

expelled from the Reich.

forced still more nuns to resign, because they wanted no part
of

t he

.

promot~on

0

f

.

.

prom~scu~ty

among youngsters. 12

Not

surprisingly, nerlin found itself with a severe shortage of
teachers in nlsace-Lorraine, which led to some reversals of
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the teaching restrictions.

Beginning in 1875, nuns were allowed

to take the required state examinations.

In 1879, Field

Marshal von Manteffcl, the new governor, continued the policy
of religious and educational conciliation by allowing normal

schools on a confessional basis, as well as schools segregated
by sex, and by reopening the petits s&minaires, elementary
schools fOr future priests, most of which had closed in the
early 1870's.
The language issue was closely tied to the educational

system.

Contrary to popular belief, the Germans never enacted

blanket legislation suppressing the use of the French language.
They understood that it would have been impossible to force
·French-speaking adults to learn and use German; instead.
concentrated on school children.

they

Time was on their side:

by

educating the youngest generation in the German language and
ways, someday the whole Reichsland could be Germanized, physically,
if not mentally.

From 1871 to 1874, the teaching of French

was prohibited in grade schools and all instruction was to be
given in German.

Nonetheless, many exceptions were allowed

in areas where children needed to be bilingual.

Though I:egu

lations in secondary schools were stricter, French was still
used.

Language requirements in normal schools were flexible

until" 1888.

13

Due to differences in language patterns in

the different parts of the Reichsland, Alsace and. Lorraine had
to be considered separately.

Most Alsatians spoke either

German or the local German-based dialect; still, 20% of the
population of the Reichsland claimed French as their native

l
. sect~ons
,
·
tongue, pre d om~nant
y '~n Metz and otner
0f

1

.
14
LOrralne.
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Attempts to "fine-tune" language requirements, which began in
1890,

led only to complicated groupings, confusion,

ruption of the educational system.

and dis

IS

Language requirements were more than an educational issue;
they affected all areas of political and social life.

From

the time of the annexation, there was local agitation for
instruction in French, as German had been taught under French
rule.

The Alsatians had

convenien~ly

forgotten the 1860's,

when Napoleon III had made a vigorous, though unsuccessful,
attempt to impose the French language upon German-speaking
natives of Alsace.

The German reverse program would not enjoy

much more success.

Though the ReicDsland 1 s national assembly

(the Landesausschuss) repeatedly passed motions requiring
mandatory French instruction, the German government, not
bound by local legislation, kept hedging and making excuses,
.

16

while fining or imprisoning agltators . .

,German was the offi

cial language of business, of the courts, of the public.
German street signs went up, except in Metz, where the signs
were allowed to be bilingual.
signs to be in

German~

One law required all new shop

storekeepers kept their Old, dilapidated

(French)

signs as a matter of pride.

Liquidation Totale

(Fren~h)

was now Totale Liquidiation--by law.

The usual incon

sistencies were to be found even in the spiritual realm.
mons were allowed to be preached in French every

~unday

Ser
in

Mulhouse, but only th;ee times a month in colmar. 17
German language requirements certainly had an effect on
businesses in the Reichsland, but commerce and industry were
more fundamentally -affected by ·the annexation itself and its

1
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accompanying tariff changes.

Overall, German manufacturers

tried'to thwart the integration of Alsace-Lorraine into their
economic system, because integration meant competition.

Alsatian

-interests were sacrificed time and again to those of the federal
states.

Prospective programs for the Reich were tested using

the conquered Reichsland as a guinea pig.
Alsace-Lorraine in 1871 had two major industries, textiles
and iron, and one major river port, at Strasbourg.

18

with

the annexation, the Alsatian textile industry lost its French
market, while the underdeveloped German industry gained poten
tially dangerous competition.

The South German manufacturers

pressured Berlin to negotiate for low tariffs so that the
Alsatians would not take over their markets.

The Alsatian

textile industry united, ignoring their differences for the
moment,

to make overtures on their own -behalf.

!ligh French-

German tariffs would separate the sp1nning and weaving opera
tions in Alsace from the finishing and dyeing operations in
France.

These efforts enjoyed limited success.

The agreements

provided for a transition period of two years, with gradually
increasing tariffs until January I, 1873.

This would not be

the end of the troubles for the textile industry, however.
The high French protectionist tariffs of 1890-1902, known as
the M'line tariffs, also did tlleir share of damage.

In 1892,

the new Chancellor Caprivi negotiated trade agreements with
neighboring countries, disregarding Alsatian interests.

The

one with Switzerland hurt the textile industry, while the
agreement with Italy squeezed many of the Alsatian wine pro
ducers out of their former markets.

General European
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depressions in the 1870's and 1890's were of no help.

Alsatian

industrialists who could afford to do so moved their operations

to France, while others tried to accomodate themselves to the
German market--a costly transition.

Coarser materia15 were

in demand in Germany, rather than the finer, more luxurious
goods required for the French market, and modification of the

equipment was expensive.

Alsace-Lorraine lost considerable

management, labor, and capital resources to France.

An extreme

case is the town of Bischwillcr, which in 1869 had a population

of 11,500 and a labor force of 5000.

By 1874 the population

had fallen to 7700 and the labor force to 1800.

The number

of weaving machines went from 2000 in 1869 to only 650 in 1874.
The Lorraine iron industry, though checked by the annexation,
held up well under the transition.

Until 1895, there was no

competition between the Lorraine and Ruhr iron industries.
Lorraine produced cast iron, while the Ruhr factories manu
factured steel products.

Z\ll concerned would have benefitted

from a proposed Moselle River canal project, which would have
facilitated lraue between the two areas.

As the Lorraine

industry developed, however, competition began and the project
was dropped.

The Rhineland coal and steel interests did not

want steel products from Lorraine competing in their markets.
The main conflict over the Rhine trade was between Strasbourg,
in Alsace, and Mannheim, in Baden.

The Rhine was quite navi

gable through Mannhcim, but farther north, at Strasbourg,
regulating the river, by dredging and riverbank inprovements,
would increase trade appreciably.
over details for years.

The authorities haggled

Work finally started in 1907, with

l~
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Strasbourg and Alsace-Lorraine paying the majority of the
costs.

Strasbourg's position did improve:

1,988,310 tons of

goods passed through the port in 1913, compared with 627,020
tons in 1907.

~~

Just when the future looked bright for the

Alsatians, however, the Germans opened a port at Kehl, directly
across the river from Strasbourg, with superior railroad con
nections.

Once again, Alsace-Lorraine got the bad end of the

deal, and economic integration was frustrated.

Germanization

was making no progress in the economic realm.
Alsace-Lorraine was used as a testing ground for at
least two unsuccessful federal programs.

Alcoholism had

become a major cause of death in Alsace after 1870.

Excessive

amounts of inferior liquor were being imported from southern
Europe, because of tariff advantages, and being imbibed by
the Alsatians.

Government experiments with taxes and liquor

license fee increases had no effect on the alcoholism rate
and only served to irritate the population.

The other ill

starred government adventure concerned a federal tobacco mono
poly similar to the one which already existed in France.

The

Strasbourg tobacco plant was already owned by the government,
having simply passed from France to Germany with the Treaty
of Frankfort.

The Germans saw the healthy profit the French

tobacco monopoly brought the government and wanted to try it
themselves.

The Strasbourg plant stockpiled huge amounts of

tobacco products, especially cigars, in anticipation of an
imminent; government takeover.

But a major difference existed

between the German and French situations.
-

The French had

established their monopoly while the tobacco industry was still
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undeveloped.

The German government, on the other hand, could

not afford the expropriation payments to its private entrepre

neurs, and the monopoly bill was defeated in the Reichstag.
This spelled disaster for the Strasbourg tobacco plant anll the

Alsatian planters.

Both the quality and the quantity of

Alsatian tobacco declined from 1871 to 1918, because the indus
try had no incentive to improve.

Just as economic integration was

fr~strated,

so was poli

tical integration of the Reichsland into the Reich, as an
examination of laws, constitutions, and political developments

will demonstrate.

Alternating periods of coercion and con

ciliation succeeded in alienating even the pro-German faction
1n Alsace-Lorraine.
The annexation started off with a period of ·repression.
The Germans, justifiably insecure about their powers in the
newly-won territory, wanted to make certain that the Alsatians
and Lorrainers knew who was in charge.

~he

Dictatorship Article

of December 30, 1871, mentioned earlier in this chapter, is
a prime example of their lack of confidence.

Jnder international

law, plenty of repressive legislation left over from the
Napoleonic regimes was still valid in Alsnce-Lorraine.

Actually,

the hated Dicatorship Article merely duplicated existing
··
aut h or~tar~an
powers. 19

.
It was, however, more 0 b VlOUS
to the

public and caused popular agitation und general bad feelings.
Even so, the

Germa~s

did not repeal it until 1902, during a

period of concessions, because to do so would have been a sign
of weak.ness.
Authoritarian.government was not the only aspect of the
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Pan-Germanist campaign.

The Pan-Germanists were the ultra

nationalists in Germany, whose ubjective in Alsace-Lorraine
was to convince the government that more strictness was always

cdlleu for.

Because of the temperament of the people. they

felt that many "lois "d'exception." or Germanization laws, were

necessary.

L-.

Language regulations predominated, but many other

areas were included.

For instance, one law was passed sup

pressing the Alsatian Society of r-techanical Construction,

because its leader was a Frenchman.
were ignored and resented.

20

In general, these laws

As Paul 06rou!ede put it I

liThe

struggle against the French language is One of the most ridi
culous aspects of the pan-germanist campaign.

They

would even germanize red skirts and blue skies.,,21

Resentment

of the "lois d'exception" led to explicit rebellion and intentional disregard of the laws.
anonymous

Alsatia~:

David Starr Jordan quotes an

"When the last Pan-germanist shall be put

under the sod, on that very day

~lsace

will find herself

germanized as if by enchantment and with the best grace in the
world.,,22
The aspect of German rule most resented by the Alsatians
was probably their loss of autonomy, of influence over their
own destinies.
named Alsatian:

This frustration was expressed by another un
"It is as easy to make the feelings of Alsace

understood at Berlin as to inject by osmosis the essence of
violet through the skin of a hippopotamus.

23
11

The Germans did

indeed govern the Reichsland without input from its inhabi
tants.

Not until 1918, in a last-ditch effort to keep the

area from being returned to France, did an Alsatian head the

L
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territorial administration.

To placate the people, beginning

in 1874, Berlin granted Alsace-Lorraine several rights in the
federal government.

lute,

beca~se

could have
withdrawn.

Never, however, were these rights abso

they were granted by the federal government and

j~st

as easily,

if circumstances warranted, been

As of January I, 1874, Alsace-Lorraine was entitled

to fifteen representatives in the Reichstag,
of the federal Jegislature.

the lower house

Laws concerning Alsace-Lorraine

now needed the consent of the Rcichstag, rather than being
er.acted solely by the emperor and the Bundesrat,

the upper

chamber of the leyislature.

A Landesausschll!'>s, or local legis

lature, was created to serve

a~

advisory role--it might be

consulted on legislation concerning Alsace-Lorrai:1€ ,
consultation was cO:1venient.

when such

The Alsatians immediately elcc

ted fifteen "protestaires," Slr protesters of annexation, to
represent theIT in the Reichstag.

~

They obviously were not yel

willing to be Gerrranizcd.
On JUly 4, 1879, Alsace.-:'orrainc was granted a "Constitution."
The Landesamischus5 was doubled in size and given the power

to propose

legisla~ion.

They could not enact it,

however;

all
legislation needed the approval of the Bundesrat. which
,
consisted of the German princes.

The

~osition

of Statthaltcr

was crealed ,to replace the President-Superior, and the Statt
halter was responsible only to the Kaiser.

This "const.itution"

represented a recognition of the, dissatisfaction, of the people,
not a step toward self-government.

NO

rights were guaranteed.

The first Statthalter was Field t-larsh.:ll von Manteuffel, who
h<=lS

be£n described as an "iron hand in a velvet glove.,,24
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Manteuffel was a diplomat--experienced, friendly,
well-liked--and a good choice for the job.

courteous,

He tried very

hard to get to know the Alsatians and to reassure them about
their new government.

ters.

lie even used French in unofficial encoun

Much of the progress that he might have made, however,

was nullified by his lower ministers, who sought to discredit
him and gave him little support.

Besides, Manteuffel was

first of all a Pruss ian, and occasionally he had to enforce
unpopular repressive legislation.

Upon his deattl in June,

1885,

the government could see no physical signs of the progress of
Germanization and decided to change its tactics.
Manteuffel's successor, Prince Chlodwig von Hohcnlohe
Schillingsftirst, was cold and reserved, the embodiment of
the government's irritation with the recalcitrant Reichsland.
The period of greatest repression in Alsace-Lorraine was
during Hohenlohe' s administra tion. "Increased militarism was
becoming a way of life in Germany, as the country geared up
for the wars to come.

In 1887, the government tried to pass

the notorious Law of the Septennate, which would provide for
military appropriations for a period of seven years, thus
deprlving the legislature of all control over the military.
When the Reichstag protested, it was dissolved by Bismarck,
who took the question to a referendum.

Through violent cam

paigning and exaggeration of the imminent danger of war, the
military won its victory at the polls.

Despite government

success l.n the federal states, Stattha"l ter Hohenlohe' s attempts
to use the war scare to gain cooperation in Alsace-Lorraine
failed.

The-Alsatians once again elected fifteen "protestaires"
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to the

~eichstag.

The "protestaires" received 82, 000 more

votes in this election than in 1874.

25

The Alsatians had

obviously not learned their lesson, and Bismarck was more than
happy to lend a hand with their discipline.

A period of

punishment and repression followed the election.
organizations were attacked and dissolved.

Alsatian

No exclusion of

Germans as members or use of French was allowed.

The required

use of passports for any non-German entering Alsace-Lorraine
was enacted on June 1, 1888.

No French military personnel

were granted passports at all, and they were allowed only in
exceptional cases for others.

The official German doctrine

was that it waS the French, not the Germans, who terrorized
Alsace with their peer pressure.
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The Germans were obviously

doing the Alsatians a great service by cutting off all commu
nication with the former homeland, though the Alsatians did
not appreciate their efforts.

There may have been other motives

for the passport policy, as well.

The new Chancellor Caprivi,

who replaced Bismarck in 1890, said that the passports were
effective as a means "to deepen the gulf which separated
France from Germany.,,2?

Statthalter Hohenlohe wrote in his

memoirs on May 8, 1888, that the ulterior motive to the soon
to-be-imposed passport system was to drive the Alsatians to
revolt so that martial law could be enacted.
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Repression

continued throughout the administration of 1I0he!1lohe, with
the censorship of mail and newspapers.

Finally the Germans

were beginning to see some "progress," tangible effects of
their repressive programs.
quieted their resentlnent.

The Alsatians and Lorrainers
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By 1894. when Hohenlohe-Schi llingsftlrst was made Chancellor,

L

the Germans no longer felt threatened by the Alsatian insistence
on autonomy and individual rights.

Prince Hermann von Hohenlohe-

Langenburg was appointed Statthalter, and the government began
making some concessions.

They loosened the passport restric

tions, then removed them altogether.
enforced.

Less censorship was

Finally, in 1902, the despised Dictatorship Article

of the Law of December 30, 1871, was repealed.
right for reform.

The mood was

Allover Germany a self-consciousness was

beginning to stir, a desire to end the autocratic rule of the
Kaiser and give more power to the parliament and to the people.

Germans started to question voting procedures.

All of Germany

elected its officials by a class voting system, with more
weight rlaced upon the upper-class, educated portion of the
electora te.

Prussia did not even have a secret ballot.

The

people in general and the liberal political parties also
demanded autonomy for Alsace-Lorraine, although this was very
low on the government's list of priorities.

The official

government stance was that Alsace-Lorraine needed to prove
i tse If "worthy," to meet some vague condi tions.

Any reform

in the Reichsland must be consistent with the security of
Reich and strengthen Alsatian-German ties.
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th~

Still, some

action would have to be taken in the Reichsland.

German

~mmi-

grants there were second-class citizens as well, and they
were getting restless.
more than three decades.

The Alsatians had been restless for
In the end, the general demand for

reform was answered with minimal change.
In 1907, Hohenlohe-Langenburg was replaced as Statthalter
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by General Count Karl von Wedel, a very autocratic supporter
of the Kaiser.

Despite his conservative beliefs, Wedel knew

that constitutional reform in Alsace-Lorraine was necessary
for him to attain his political goals, and his public stance
was that it was time for the Germans to show some trust in
the Alsatians.

In 1909, Theobald von Bethmann-Hollweg, a

Prussian bureaucrat, was appointed Chancellor.

Despite his

cautious, conservative approach to reform. he, too, recog
nized the need for change in Alsace-Lorraine.

-On March 15,

1910, he announced the government's agreement to a new consti
tution for Alsace-Lorraine, and on April 30, even the emperor
added his approval.

Thus the way was cleared for reform-

but the Landesausschuss, the Alsatian legislature, was not to
be consulted as to the changes.

The Alsatians still had not

proved themselves worthy of the government's trust.
The new Constitution of Alsace-Lorraine was upproved On
May 26, 1911, by the Reichstag.

The Landesausschuss was made

bicameral, with the lower house to be elected by universal
manhood sllffrage.

The effects of these liberalized votirlg

procedures were minimized by a three-year residence-require
ment, plural voting based on age, and gerrymandering by the
federal government.
Berlin.
power.

The upper chamber was cOntrolled by

The Landesausschuss was granted illusory budget
If the Alsatian budget disagreed with the one desired

by the German government, Berlin could still levy taxes and
spend at will.

Because the executive branch was still the

German bureaucracy, the Landesausschuss had no means of
enforcing its legislation.

Alsace-Lorraine was granted three

44
votes in the upper chamber of the federal legislatJre, the
Bundesrat, but they had to vote as the Statthalter directed,
Their votes were

thus protecting the emperor's interests.

nullified, however, if Prussia thereby gainec a majority, thus
protecting the interests of the other states.

Consequently,

the Alsatian voting right meant absolutely nothing.

Limitations

on the use of the French language were incluced in the consti
tution.

There was no assurance of permanence, because the

constitution could be amended by the federal parliament, not
by the LandesauGschuss.

of

Alsace-~orraine's

Most importantly,

legal status.

no mention was made

The Alsatians' one great

desire, autonomy within the Reich, was ignored once again.
Alsace-Lorraine remained a federal territory.
The Constitution of 1911 understandably led to disillu
sionment among the people of nlsace and Lorraine.

It was

followed by a government crackdown on malcontents, from 1911
~

~

.

hbbe'Wetter1e, the edltor of a Colmar paper, was

to 1914.

fined and imprisoned for his protests.

A merchant in Mulhouse

was expelled fron.Alsace for requesting a hotel band to play
the "r-tarseillaise.

II

Any merchant suspected of French sympathies L

was persecuted by a boycott enforced by the government.

The

Alsdtian cartoonist 11ansi of Colmar was prosecuted for treason
in 1914 because of a caricature of a Pan-Germanist high school
teacher.
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Despite the Alsatians' disenchantment and the

government's impolitic response,

t~e

Constitution of 1911 led

to a more national outlook in the Reichsland.

In the first

local election um]er the new law, in 1911, basically conservative,
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clerical sentiments appeared.

But the recently-formed Nationa!-

bund, a "party dedicated to protecting regional interests and

to full autonomy and equality within the empire, suffered a
crushing defeat.
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Any party, to be successful at the polls,

had to advocate Alsatian

natiunali~m

in some form, but the

government frowned upon this particularism.
was too radical, even for the Alsatians.

The Nationalbund

In the 1912 parlia

mentary elections, national issues outweighed the regional.
War and peace, military budgeting, and foreign policy measures
were important to the reapIe.32

The founding of the Mit Lel

partei, a party which stressed a closer bond with the empire,
and of a pro-German wing in the Alsace-Lorraine

Ce~ter

"
,
,
]]
were promlslng
slgns
0 f a f uture conCl'1'latlon.

party,

Th en t h e

progress of forty-two years was destroyed by the Zabern affair.
Zabern (':Saverne n in French) was a little town of 9000
inhabitants in the Vosges foothills of northern A!sace, with
no special distinction--until the autumn of 1913.
German lieutenant, Baron von

F~rstncr,

A young

displayed his immaturity

in his relationships with the Alsatian troops under his command.
He offered a ten-mark prize to anyone to "stick" any Alsatian
who might "assault" him.

When he went out to buy chocolate,

he had himself guardeci. by four soldiers with bayonets.

In

general, he behaved in a ridiculous and belligerent manner,
dod was mocked by the people for his childishness.

Ilis comman

ding officer, Colonel von Reutter, supported him and took the
law into his own hands.

He prepared for a seige, stationed

soldiers with machine quns on street corners, and initiated
arbitrary,: arrests.

People were arrested for laughing,

for

~
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not moving,

for moving too quickly.

On November 25.

the Reichs

tag debated the problem of Zabern and later passed a motion

censuring Chancellor Bethmann-Hollweg for his lack of response.
For the first time, a question of Alsace concerned all of
Germany.
that

The Minister of War, General von Falkenhayn, pronounced

F~rstner's

actions were not insults because he did not

know that "his words would become known to the pUblic.,,34
ignominious treatment of citi2ens continued.
F~rstner

The

On December 2,

attacked a civilian group, who allegedly laughed at

him, and severely injured a lame cobbler.

The cobbler had

shown "disrespect" and protested his innocence, and as his
punishment,

F~rstner

slashed him in the forehead with his sword,

while soldiers held him still.

Several townspeople, including

thrce jUdges of the civil tribunal, were arrested one evening
on their way home and held overnight at the military jail.
Testimony given at the session of the Higher court-Martial at
Strasbourg, which began on January 5, 1914. is informative.
A Lieutenant Schadt's justification for arresting the judges
of the civil tribunal was as follows:
The public prosecutor was particularly provocative.
One of the judges said to me, "I wi 11 take no orders
from you." Naturally I arrested him.
I had every
man whom I suspected of laughing at us arrested.
As they were too cowardly to do it to our faces one
had to be guided by presumption.
We were obliged to
break into some houses to catch the delinquents. 35
The Court-Martial acquitted Schadt on the grounds that he was
obeying orders.

Reutter,

the commanding officer, was acquitted

because he was innocent of the intent to violate the law.
F~rstner

And

was acquitted because.he had exercised his right of
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"p'.J.oitivc sclf-dcfense"--the cobbler was carrying a pocket

knife in his pocket.

Count Kurl von Wedel, the Statthalter,

and many of the local officials

resig~ed.

The Zabern affair was an unquestionable victory for the
military caste in Germany.

The army belonged to the Kaiser,

and the Kaiser was sovereign.

The civil authority,

repre

sentell in the Heich by Oethmann-llollweg and in the Reichsland

by Wedel, was powerless in comparison.

Bethmann-Hollweg did

not handle the affair as the parliament would have liked, and
thus received a vote of no confidence, but there was little

else he could do.

Alsace was still a conquered province, no

different than in 1871.

The lack of respect shown the people

of Alsace and Lorraine indicates how

t~ose

in power regarded

their "long-lost brothers" after forty-two years.

i,
I,

Concll,lsion

Did Germanization make
any progress. in Alsace-Lorraine
.
from 1871 to 1918?
no.

The underlying Alsatian spirit was not altered by German

laws and policies.
led

On the surface, perhaps;, fundamentally,

~nly

Repression interspersed with conciliation

to distrust and suspicion, not to improved relations.

"Current" doggerel of 1913 expressed the Alsatians' sentiments:

.

.

"Franl5ais ne peux,
Prussien ne veux,
Alsacien ~uis.'·l
"French I can't be,
Prussian I won't be,
Alsatian I am."
Li'irst and foremost, an Alsatian considers himself Als·atian.
And he considers all Alsatians Frenchmen, no matter what ·the
native tongue.
Forty-seven years under German rule did certainly change
,

the Alsatian way of life.

Many Alsatians would have preferred

autonomy in 1919 to a reunion with France. 2

And the subsequent

reunification posed difficulties for much of the population.
German immigrants and Alsatians who had·grown up under the
German regime suffered the same problems of adaptation as the
French citizens of Alsace and Lorraine tlad experienced in 1871.
Many Alsatian Germans held on to their loyalty to their German

•

homeland:

18,000 Alsatians died for Germany in the second

1
49

World war.

3

But when the Germans occupied Alsace again during

World War II,

their efforts at Germanization were just as

unsuccessful as during the- 1871-1918 annexation.

How successful did the people of that time consider the
German attempts?

Count von Caprlvi, who in 1890 would become

Chancellor, admitted in 1888, "It is a fact that after seven

teen years of annexation, the German spirit has made no pro
gress in Alsacc.,,4

Jacques Preiss, a representative to the

Reichstag and leader of

"Young

l\lsace," in 1896 elaborated on

the same idea:

,

Gentlemen, the people of Alsace-Lorraine protested
in 1871.
They protested through their representatives,
specially elected Eor that prupose, against the
annexation to Germany.
This protest has not been
withdrawn since, either in law, or in fact.
The assimilation, the Germanization of the country
has not advanced a step to this day.
Fear
poisons our political existence.
The Government
does not understand the people, and the people do
not understand the Government.
History will
say:
"The German Empire succeeded in conquering
Alsace-Lorriane materially, but its administration
did not know how to conquer her morallYI did not
know how to win the heart and soul of the people. liS

Neither the governors nor the governed considered the German
ization program a success.

The attempts were neither systematic

nor enduring, and the results satisfied no-one.

The.Zabern

affair was the final insult for both the Alsatians and the
German civilian government.

It demonstrated the attitude of

the true rulers of Alsace, the military:

the Alsatians were

conquered people, unworthy of equality or even of respect.
Germanization had not made much progress among the military
rulers either.

.....(~

.

..............

----

)

50

We will, of course, never know what might have
if_war had not broken out in 1914.
contin~ed

happe~ed

The Germans could have

their policies, while time did its work, changing

the outlook and cha=acter of the people.
attempts which were made so
son of Statthalter
the conquered

unsuccessf~l?

But why were the
Prince Alexander,

~ohenlohe-Schillingsftlrst, theorized

provi~ces

that

could successfully have been governed

in three different ways--none of which were adopted by the
qovernrnent.

First, Alsace and Lorraine could have been parti

tioned among the existing federal states.

I~

this way the

Alsatians would have been full German citizens, while there
would have been little need to worry about a dangerous revolt.
Second,

'Alsn~~-Lorraine

could have been made an equal federal

state within the errpirc.

Militarily, the Gernlans felt too

insecure to enact this option, as was discussed in Chapter II.
The third solutiOn would have been to express a genuine respect
for the needs and desires of the Als~tians. 6

In Chapter III

we saw how the Germans actually treated the Alsatians:
guined

plg~,

as a military necessity, as a

vanqui~hpd

as
n~tion.

As David Starr Jordan points out, a Franco-German understanding
would have alleviated much of ,the tension, because friendliness
to one nation would not tave been treachery to the other. 7

No

such understanding was achievec1 UJllil much later, ufter
World War II.
The Alsace of today, though typically :f.r-encb, is very
proud of :its own culture:
traditions.

its languaqe, its legends, and its

When I asked a woman from Strasbourg about the

French influence on Alsacc, shc responded emphatically, in
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~

r ~r. '1\

French, that one cannot speak of the French influence on Alsace,
because the latter is itself French.
of German domination, the nlsatians
Frenchmen,

Even during the period
tho~ght

and acted as

though they expressed themselves in German.

8

Ger

manization of Alsace-Lorraine, a very complex concept, was a
simple failure.

No trace of the German efforts remains today.

Notes

Chapter I:
1 David Starr Jordan, Alsace-Lorraine:
A Study in Conquest:
1913 (Indianapolis:
Bobbs-Merrill Co., 1916), p. 80.

2 Information for the remainder of Chapter I was taken
from the following books and encyclopedias:
1913,

David Starr Jordan, Alsace-Lorraine: A Study in Conquest:
(Indianapolis:
Babbs Merrill Co., 1916).

Charles Downer Hazen, Alsace-Lorraine Under German Rule
(New York:
Henry Holt and Co., 1917).
Camille Schneider, translated by Gladys Wheelhouse,
Alsace (Munich: Wilhelm Andermann Verlag, 1961).

~

Dan P. Silverman, Reluctant Union:
Alsace-Lorraine and
Imperial Germany 1871-1918 (University Park and London:
The Pennsylvania University. Press, 1972).
"Alsace,"

Larousse du XXe Si~cle,

1928 ed.
Si~cle,

"Alsace-Lorraine,"

Larousse du XXe

1928 ed.

"Alsace-Lorraine,"

Encyclopedia Brittanica, 1971 cd.

"Elsass-Lothringen," Meyers Grosses Konversationslexicon,
1903 ell.
Michael Kraus,
1977 ed.

"Alsace-Lorraine,"

Dietrich Eugen Mende,
Encyclopedia, 1973 ed.

II

Collier's Encyclopedia,

Alsace- Lorraine," Chambers's

"Reichsland Elsass-Lothringen,
1956 ed.

II

Der Grosse Brockhaus,

Leon Voet,

"Alsace,"

Chambers's Encyclopedia, 1973 ed.

Leon Voet,

"Lorraine," Chambers's Encyclopedia, 1973 ed.

53
3

Jordan, p. 8l.

4

Schneider, p. 9 •

5

Schneider, p. 9.

6

Hazen, p.

49.

7 Hazen, p. 5l.
8

Hazen, pp.

9

10
11

12
13

58-59.

Hazen, p. 68.
Silverman, p.

11.

Silverman, p. 12.

Hazen, p.

7l.

Silverman, p. 14.

14 Hazen,· p.
77 •

Chapter I I :
1 Information on the social, political, and economic
situation of Alsace-Lorraine in 1869 is from Chapter 2, "Local
Attitudes and German Aims 1869-1871" in Reluctant Union by
Dan P. Silverman.

2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11

12
13

Silverman, pp. 25-27 .

Election data:

Silverman, p.
Silverman, p.
Hazen, p.

30.
30.

86.

Hazen, p. 94.
Silverman, p. 32.
Silverman, p.
Hazen, p.
Hazen,

p.

32.

78.
3.

Hazen,
pp. 5-6.
,
Hazen, p.

7.

Hazen, p. 13 .

54
14

Hazen, p.

14.

Chapter I I I :
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8

Jordan, p.

24.

Jordan, p. 34.

Hazen, p. 104.
Hazen, pp. 113-114.

Silverman, p. 66.
Silverman, p. 68.
Hazen, pp. 100-10l.

Silverman, p. 72.

9 Andr~ Hallays, translated by Frank Roy Fraprie, The
Spell of Alsace (Boston:
The Page Co., 1919), p. 154.
10

Hallays, p. 90.

11 81. 1 verrnan, p.
12 81. 1 verrnan,
13
14
15
16

3l.

p. 102.

.
Sllverman, pp. 76-77 .

Hazen, p. 172.
.
Sllverman, p. 78 .

Hazen, pp. 171-172.

17 81. 1 verman, p.

80.

18 Industrial figures are from Chapter 9, "Political
Economy in the Reichsland" in Reluctant Union by Dan P.
Silverman.
19 81. 1 verman,
p.
20
-.
I

J

,~

I,

J

21

,
Joraan, p.

Jordan, pp.

22 J oroan,
'
23
24

87.

5l.
52-53.

p. 109.

Jordan, p. 70.
Hazen, p. 124.

55
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32

Hazen,

p. 132.

Hazen, p. 135.
Hazen, p. 136.
Hazen, p. 138.
Silverman, p. 137.
Hazen, p. 185.
Silverman, p. 159.
Silverman, p. 160.

33 Silverman,
p. 162.
34
35

Hazen, p. 192.
Hazen, p.

35.

Conclusion:
1

~

City:

Jordan, .p. 83.

2 Norah Lofts and Margery Weiner, Eternal france
Doubleday and Co,. Inc., 1968), p. 275.
3

4
5
6

7

(Garden

"Alsace- Lorraine," Encyclopedia Brittanica, 1971 ed.

Hazen, p. 136.
Hazen, p. 162.
·1 verman, p.

s~

Jordan,

203.

p. 106.

8 Letter received from Mme. Georgina Frank, January 15,
1979.

,

,~

I

Bibliography

"Alsace."

Larousse du XXe Siecle.

1928 ed.

"Alsace-Lorraine. "

Encyclopedia Bri t tanica.

"A1sace-Lorraine."

Larousse du XXe Siecle.

"Elsass-Lothringen."
1903 ed.
Frank, Georgina.

1971 ed.
1928 ed.

Meyers Grosses Konversationslexicon.

Letter to author.

January 15, 1979.

Hazen, Charles Downer.
Alsace-Lorraine Under German Rule.
New York:
Henry Holt and Co. I 1917.
Hallays, Andre.
The Spell of Alsace.
Boston:
The Page Co., 1919.

Trans. Frank Roy Fraprie.

Jordan, David Starr. A1sace-Locraine:
A Study in Conquest:
1913.
Indianapolis:-- Bobbs Merrill Co., 1916.
Kraus, Michael.
1977 ed.

"Alsace-Lorraine."

Collier's Encyclopedia.

Ktirenberg, Joachim von.
The Kaiser.
Trans. H. T. Russell
and Herta Hagen.
New York:
Simon and Schuster, 1955.
Lofts, Norah, and Margery Weiner.
Eternal France.
Doubleday and Co., Inc., 1968.
Mach, Edmund von.
What Germany Wants.
and Co., 1914.

Boston:

Mende, Dietrich Eugen.
"Alsace-Lorriane."
r:~ncyclopedia.
1973 ed.
Nann, Henri.

L' Alsace.

Paris:

Garden City:

Little, Brown,

Chambers's

Librairie Larousse, 1973.

Nowak, Karl Friedrich. Germany's Road to Ruin.
Trans. E. W.
Dickes.
New York:
The MacMillan Co., 1932.
"Reichsland Elsass-Lothringen."

Der Grosse Brockhaus.

Schneider, camille.
Alsace.
Trans. Gladys Wheelhouse.
Wilhelm Andermann Verlag, 1961.

1956 cd.
Munich:

57

Silverman, Dan P.
Reluctant Union:
Alsace-Lorraine and
Imperial Germany 1871 1918.
University Park and London:
The Pennsylvania State University Press,

1972.

The Decline of French Patriotism 1870-1940.
Tint, Herbert.
Liverpool:
C.Tinling and Co Ltd., 1964.
Voet, Leon.

"Alsace."

Chambers' 5

"Lorraine."

Encyclop~dia.

1973 cd.

Chambers's Encyclopedia.

1973 eeL

,

~~-

